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Time for a paradigm shift? Medical Law in Transition 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The dominant approach to medical law in this country has been a highly rational 
ethical consumerism.1 It sees medical law as unified around ethical concepts such as 
respect for autonomy and self-determination, truth-telling, confidentiality, respect for 
people (including their dignity), and justice.2 It sees one of its key tasks as redressing 
the imbalance of power that exists between expert medical practitioners and lay 
patients by establishing ground rules for the relationships between them.3 It also 
worries that important moral judgments are being clothed with the mystique of 
professional expertise and appropriated by medicine from their proper place as social 
and political problems.4 In essence, this approach is based on a liberal account of law 
protecting independent rights-based principles. Medical law is a species of applied 
ethics, implying a staged process of applying ethical principles to a problem and 
deriving the necessary legal rules from that application. The social and political 
dynamics of health care are regarded either as a distracting distortion impeding the 
implementation of progressive law reform or as evidence of the need for such 
intervention. The roots of medical law on this model are external to medicine, and law 
is a mechanism for regulating the professions in the public interest. 
 
I want to suggest that this approach has failed to account for the way in which the 
subject has actually developed. I have argued before that the focus on medicine is too 
limited and that there are important social and organisational issues raised by our 
National Health Service that should lead us to consider the law governing health care 
rather than just medicine as the natural focus of our activity.5 However, the work of 
doctors remains extremely important even within this subject area. This paper 
suggests that the approach I have described as liberal in its nature has fostered a 
paradigm for the discipline of medical law that now makes it hard to understand and 
explain the rules of law and outcome of cases involving the work of health 
professionals. I shall use the term medical law (and by extension medical lawyers) to 
describe the corpus of such rules and cases that are understood to constitute a discrete 
subject for study. In order to define a subject sufficiently precisely to enable further 
study, it is necessary to develop a working hypothesis, or paradigm, of its underlying 
coherence. Such a paradigm is useful so long as the data to be examined has a rough 
degree of ‘fit’. However, when it begins to distort that data, consideration needs to be 
given to the need for a new way of conceptualising the subject. This paper suggests 
that such a transformation of the paradigm of medical law needs to occur in order to 
                                                 
1 For this characterisation of the dominant approach, see J. Montgomery, ‘Medical Law in the Shadow 
of Hippocrates’ (1989) 52 MLR 566-576. 
2 I. Kennedy & A. Grubb, Medical Law: Text with Materials (London: Butterworths, 1994), 3. See also 
I. Kennedy, ‘Emerging Problems of Medicine, Technology, and the Law’ in I. Kennedy Treat Me Right 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
3 I. Kennedy, ‘The doctor-patient relationship’ in P. Byrne, Rights and Wrongs in Medicine (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 7-21, esp. 12-15. 
4 I. Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (St Albans, Granada 1983). 
5 J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 1-4. 
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take account of the actual practice of lawmakers and the changing context in which 
the law operates. 
 
I shall begin by outlining key issues that arise in relation to the generally accepted 
paradigm and then explore the tensions in maintaining it as a framework within which 
to analyse medical law. I shall suggest that an examination of the way in which the 
courts, the health professions, and the NHS have regulated standards of practice 
shows how the idea of externally driven scrutiny has been less effective than had been 
hoped by many commentators. Instead, a paradigm based on the development of 
values within the health care communities provides a more illuminating model for 
explaining the subject. Examples from the handling of malpractice, patients’ rights 
and problems of medical ethics are used to make a series of points, but also to 
illustrate how the concerns of this paper can help explain the full compass of the 
subject. The exploration of malpractice suggests that litigation has done little to 
establish standards and attention should turn to the evaluation of the emerging quality 
assurance model to see whether it might be more effective. Consideration of key areas 
of patients’ rights indicates that they have been given fuller attention by the 
institutions of health care than by the courts and that the current Government’s 
modernisation agenda for the NHS requires a more corporate approach than the 
traditional legal models have indicated. Finally, an examination of the treatment of 
medical ethics by the courts suggests that they are less concerned than the traditional 
paradigm would lead us to expect with substantive rules and that other models of the 
role of the judiciary should be considered. 
 
 
A paradigm under pressure 
 
The widely accepted paradigm of medical law adopts positions on a number of issues 
that are becoming increasingly problematic. First, the conception of the rule of law 
and its requirement that medical practice be regulated by principles to govern conduct 
backed up by mechanisms for accountability. The instrinsic values of medicine and 
other health professions are to be subordinated to the values of the wider community. 
Yet, this is difficult to reconcile with the continuing dominance of the Bolam 
philosophy (to be explored later). Second, commentary has traditionally given 
relatively little weight to the fact that most health care in the UK is delivered within a 
state system, the National Health Service. This has led to insufficient attention being 
given to the institutional structure of health care and to an interest in foreign 
developments with too little regard to the difficulties in translating solutions to our 
domestic context. Third, a reliance on ethical principles as providing the foundations 
for a coherent discipline has served to obscure some of the aspects of legitimation that 
are raised by the fact that medical law regulates a public service. 
(1) Medicine subject to law 
 
Understanding the sociological nature of medical ethics involves more than the 
application of general ethical and legal principles to medicine. The health professions 
have their own normative values that are only partially developed from these sources. 
Law built on that understanding would hold that the regulation of the enterprise of 
medicine would require recognition and consideration of those specific norms. This 
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presents a challenge to positions that seek to analyse problems in medical decision-
making by distinguishing those aspects that are strictly medical from those which are 
ethical, arguing that there is no medical expertise involved in the latter.6 Instead, 
medical law would need to draw on the values of the groups that come together in the 
enterprise of providing health care as well as those of the wider community. It would 
thus be more than merely the application of general principles of law in the medical 
context. It would have an intrinsic unity of its own. 
 
It is not difficult to find statements that doctors are subject to the general rule of law. 
In R v Arthur, a criminal trial concerning allegations of medical murder of a disabled 
child, the jury was directed that 
 
There is no special law in this country that places doctors in a separate 
category and gives them special protection over the rest of us…. It is because 
no doctor has special exemption, or a special right in this way, that this case 
comes before you. We have heard a good deal about medical ethics and it is a 
fact that in virtually every profession, or any trade were there is a guild of 
association of that kind, rules of conduct are set out…. But that does not mean 
that any profession can set out a code of ethics and say that the law must 
accept it. In this case it has been suggested that what Dr Arthur did here, 
whatever may be the medical ethics of the matter, has gone beyond what any 
doctor is entitled to do and has committed a crime.7
 
In fact, however, the subjection of medicine to the general law is far from being a 
simple matter. Even if judges direct juries to disregard the medical context, there is no 
guarantee that they will do so. We can only speculate whether Dr Arthur’s acquittal 
was because of or in spite of the direction that the jury received. 
 
More importantly, it seems that English law does in fact treat doctors differently from 
others. A number of actions are legal if performed by doctors but illegal if done by 
others. They include the intentional termination of pregnancy, tattooing of minors, 
removal of tissue for transplant, female circumcision (for medical purposes only), and 
the prescription of certain drugs and the use of unlicensed medicines.8 Most 
significant, however is the way in which doctors have been permitted to care for the 
dying in a way prohibited to lay carers. Non-medical carers have been prosecuted for 
failing to provide proper nutrition for those they were looking after.9 Yet in Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland it was held that professional carers could withhold food and water, 
even though it would lead to Tony Bland’s death, because it was in accordance with 
professional ethics to do so in that case.10 English law does recognise that the 
regulation of medical care requires special rules of substance and not merely extent. 
 
                                                 
6 See e.g. I. Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (1983) ch 4. 
7 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1, per Farquarson J. See also R v Adams [1957] Crim LR 365, per 
Devlin J. For rejection of the suggestion that the law of negligence treats doctors differently see Gold v 
Haringey [1987] 2 All ER 888, 893-4, per Lloyd LJ. 
8 Abortion Act 1967, Tattooing of Minors Act 1969, Human Tissue Act 1961, Prohibition of Female 
Circumcision Act 1985, Medicines Act 1968. Some of these monopolies are shared with other health 
professions. For discussion, see J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (1997) 141-2, 219-20. 
9 R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450, R v Stone [1977] 2 All ER 341, R v Gibbins & Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App 
R 134. 
10 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 FLR 1026 
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(2) The institutions of health care 
 
Recognising the complexity of professional values, requires medical law to consider 
the corporate institutions of health care, the professions and the National Health 
Service within which most health professionals work. If medical law is to reflect the 
values of those groups and bodies, it also needs to address the processes by which 
those values are produced and developed. The traditional assumption of 
commentators has been that medical law should look for its governing principles 
outside medicine. However, this paper suggests that the source of the norms that seem 
most influential in practice may be found principally in the institutions of health care 
rather than those of the law. The sources of medical law would therefore go beyond 
legislation and judicial decision.11
 
One implication of this is that law in a narrow sense has a limited place in the 
regulation of health care. This is not to say that we should reject the role of law, 
although the former health secretary, Frank Dobson, perhaps adopted such a view 
when he issued an invitation for consultation under the title ‘Lawyers out of hospitals, 
doctors out of court’.12 It does, however, imply that an extensive legalism through the 
use of consumerist rights would not play a major role in regulating health care. These 
tend both to build on an atomistic conception of the experience of being a patient and 
to characterise the relationships between doctors and those they look after as 
confrontational in nature. The fact that the law has rejected such rights is hard to 
explain within the dominant model and provides tentative support for the suggestion 
that we should re-examine that paradigm if we wish to understand the dynamic of our 
subject.13
 
If there is to be a move away from legalism in a narrow sense, one would expect to 
see greater weight being placed on improving forms of accountability and redress that 
rely on bureaucratic rather than legalistic processes. In the last five years of the 
twentieth century, the NHS has revamped its complaints procedures and extended the 
role of the Health Services Commissioner to raise the profile of less legalistic dispute 
resolution. Over the same period the medical profession has begun to rethink the role 
of its regulatory structures and become more proactive in its approach. Each of these 
developments supports the contention that an appreciation of the institutions of health 
is becoming increasingly important in understanding the area of medical law. 
 
(3) A domestic or international concern? 
 
A third characteristic that indicates that English medical law may need to be 
understood in new ways is the way that international comparisons are treated warily 
by the courts. This is less surprising if the values of medical law are to be drawn from 
those of the health care community, than from abstract moral principle. In a more 
parochial paradigm, the usefulness of overseas legal authorities will largely depend on 
the extent to which the practice of health care in those jurisdictions shares the values 
                                                 
11 See J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997) 4-20. 
12 Press Release 98/162, Wednesday 29th April 1998, ‘Dobson to tackle rising levels of litigation in the 
health service’. 
13 J. Montgomery, ‘Patients first: the role of rights’. In: Fulford K, Ersser S & Hope T (eds.) Patient 
Centred Health Care (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific, 1996) 142-152. 
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of our own system. Transplanting legal cultures will only work if the health care 
cultures are comparable. There will not be space in this paper to draw out this feature 
in detail. However, it can quickly be illustrated. The disparaging comments on the 
transatlantic doctrine of informed consent in Sidaway and the failure to export the 
English approach to Australia serve as an illustration of the difficulties of giving 
medical law an international flavour even in legal jurisdictions that share the common 
law tradition.14 Although the leading Australian case was reported in an English series 
of reports,15 presumably in the belief that it would encourage the demise of Sidaway, 
it has not been cited in English judgments. The point can also be made when it is seen 
that the English courts had considered ‘duty to warn’ cases without discussion of the 
well-known US decision of Tarasoff.16 A quick survey of the Lloyds Medical Law 
Reports for 1998 shows that no overseas cases were cited in any of the thirty-five 
cases reported for that year. Citation of cases on the European Convention on Human 
Rights is becoming commonplace, but the medical law of other domestic jurisdictions 
has little impact on judicial reasoning. 
 
(4) Legitimation 
 
If English medical law displays these characteristics, it becomes necessary to address 
questions of legitimacy in a novel way. Traditional ‘rule of law’ thinking suggests that 
legitimacy comes from subjecting medicine to law, an enterprise that some doctors 
have criticised as little more than an inter-professional turf battle.17 A more contextual 
approach would accept that medical law should grow out of the prevailing norms of 
health care practice. Legitimacy would be conferred by processes to make those 
professional norms accountable, but those processes need not themselves be legal 
processes. Nor need they necessarily relate to individual practitioners rather than to 
the profession or professions as communities. 
 
This question of legitimacy brings us to the idea that medical law may be in a 
transitional phase. The regulation of health care is undergoing a process of radical 
change. The current National Health Service reforms constitute the most radical 
reorientation since its inception.18 The Government is looking to build a brand 
identity for the NHS based on a corporate culture. Quality assurance, under the banner 
of clinical governance, is now the legal responsibility of NHS Trust boards.19 Even 
general medical practitioners, never so far brought within the managerial boundaries 
of the NHS are being wooed to adopt corporate status through primary care trusts. 
Those who accept will become subject to the cultural hegemony of the NHS 
Executive in a way that has been resolutely resisted to date. National Service 
Frameworks are being established to provide nationwide benchmarks against which 
practice can be measured.20 The National Institute for Clinical Excellence will 
                                                 
14 See especially Lord Diplock’s comments on Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 F 2d 772 and Reibl v 
Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 in his speech in Sidaway v Bethlem RHG [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
15 Rogers v Whittaker [1993] 4 Med LR 79. 
16 There was passing mention of the case in W v Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835 and in Palmer v Tees HA 
[1999] Lloyds Rep Med 359 (CA) but it was not regarded as requiring full consideration. 
17 R.A. Hope, ‘The Birth of Medical Law’ (1991) 11 OJLS 247-53. 
18 The New NHS: Modern and Dependable (London: Stationery Office 1997). 
19 Health Act 1999, s 18. 
20 E.g. National Service Framework for Mental Health: Modern Standards and Service Models 
(London: DoH 1999). 
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gradually supplant the diversity of individual clinical judgment in assessing the 
effectiveness of care, as already indicated in the discussion of the flu drug Relenza.21 
The Commission for Health Improvement will police standards and tackle failing 
services. 
 
Professional regulation too has been radically restructured. From being an 
organisation largely concerned with securing the individual autonomy of doctors and 
resisting the encroachments of external regulation, the General Medical Council has 
redefined its role.22 Its guidance on medical ethics to doctors has changed in nature 
from being advice on how to avoid falling foul of the disciplinary system to a 
statement of the values that doctors are expected to espouse.23 The transition is from a 
function based on the demarcation of occupational monopoly to one premised on the 
creation of a professional community with shared core values. The reasons for this 
transition are complex, but I have argued elsewhere that the driving force is a 
response to a crisis of confidence that threatens to undermine the status of medicine. 
Doctors now try, as nursing has done throughout the century, to use the regulatory 
system to convince the public that the profession can be trusted.24 This strategy is a 
deliberate attempt to build a new and powerful set of cultural norms that define the 
nature of medicine in our society. It aims to build a moral, not merely technical and 
scientific community of medicine. 
 
This transformation is a response to the inability of the traditional regulatory 
mechanisms of the NHS and professions to prevent failures of care in some very 
public scandals, of which events at the Bristol Royal Infirmary provide the symbolic 
focus. It will be interesting to see whether the public inquiry into those events 
identifies as radical and extensive a revolution of accountability and quality control as 
the NHS and the medical profession are already putting into place. The control of 
standards is therefore an appropriate place to begin the analysis of where English law 
is going in its transformation. 
 
 
Accounting for good practice 
 
One of the key tasks of medical law is to ensure that the practice of doctors is of an 
acceptable standard and that they can be called to account if it fails to reach that 
standard. In most industries this task is carried out through a mixture of regulatory 
strategies and the deterrent effect of liability for mishaps. In relation to medicine, the 
direct effect of litigation on standards of practice has been marginal. Despite 
                                                 
21 Doh press release 1999/0604, Friday 8th October 1999, ‘Dobson gives go ahead to NICE advice on 
relenza’. 
22 For an account from the President of the GMC of this revolution, see D. Irvine, ‘The performance of 
doctors I: professionalism in a changing world’ (1997) 314 BMJ 1540-42, D. Irvine, ‘The performance 
of doctors II: maintaining good practice, protecting patients from poor performance’ (1997) 314 BMJ 
1613-15, D. Irvine ‘Dysfunctional doctors: the GMC’s new approach’ in M. Rosenthal, L. Mulcahy & 
S. Lloyd-Bostock (eds), Medical Mishaps: pieces of the puzzle (Buckingham: Open University Press 
1999). 
23 Compare Professional conduct and discipline: fitness to practice (1992) with Good Medical Practice 
(1998, first version issued in 1995). 
24 J. Montgomery, ‘Professional regulation: a gendered phenomenon?’ in S. Sheldon & M. Thomson 
(eds) Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Law (London: Cavendish Publishing 1998). 
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widespread concern about defensive medicine, there is little evidence that doctors 
have fixed their standards by reference to what the courts might think of their work. In 
fact, both the profession and its principal employer, the National Health Service, have 
taken on the pursuit of improved standards of practice themselves. To understand why 
and how this has happened it is necessary to review the limitations of medical 
malpractice law. 
 
(1) Malpractice law 
 
It is hardly necessary to point out that the cornerstone of medical law in this 
jurisdiction has become the Bolam test. Expanding from its origins in the law of 
negligence, it has been used by the House of Lords to define the law on informed 
consent, the treatment of incapacitated patients, and to establish the limits of the 
obligation to sustain life.25 The philosophy of Bolam, by which I mean the regulation 
of health care practice through a filter of prevailing professional standards, is evident 
in many other areas of medical law. The definition of death is determined by medical 
standards.26 The legality of individual abortions depends on the honest belief of 
doctors that the grounds set out in the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended) are satisfied. 
The law makes no direct inquiry into the circumstances, but trusts two registered 
medical practitioners to do so on society’s behalf. 
 
My purpose requires a brief discussion of the Bolam test and its application. I shall 
make no attempt to explain the law in detail,27 but its key characteristics are an 
important context to the changes to which I wish to draw attention. The test, as set out 
by McNair J reads as follows 
 
A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in 
that particular art… Putting it the other way round, a doctor is not negligent, if 
he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body 
of opinion that takes a contrary view.28
 
The essence of this test is that it measures the work of doctors against the practice of 
their peers rather than against a judicial assessment of acceptable practice. It is 
reinforced by the reluctance of the courts to determine conflicts of professional 
opinion. In Maynard v W Midlands RHA, the House of Lords held that judges should 
not choose between schools of thought. 29 Once it was established that a responsible 
body of opinion accepted the practice that was followed, it was immaterial that other, 
                                                 
25 Sidaway v Bethlem RHG [1985] 1 All ER 643, Re F [1989] 2 FLR 376, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 
[1993] 1 FLR 1026. 
26 Re A [1992] 3 Med LR 303; Human Tissue Act 1961 s 1(4), (4A); A code of practice for the 
diagnosis of brain stem death: including guidelines for the identification and management of potential 
organ and tissue donors (London: Department of Health, 1998) 
27 I have set out my account of this law in J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (1997) pp 169-176. This 
was written prior to the decision of the House of Lords in Bolitho v City & Hackney HA [1997] 4 All 
ER 771, although for reasons set out below I believe that the account remains substantially accurate 
after that decision. See also M. Jones ‘Breach of Duty’ in I. Kennedy & A. Grubb (eds) Principles of 
Medical Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) 340-48. 
28 Bolam v Friern HMC [1957] 2 All ER 118, 122. 
29 Maynard v W Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 635. 
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even equally responsible, practitioners disagreed. It has further been held that even a 
very small group of doctors can constitute a ‘responsible body of opinion’ provided 
that they are appropriately skilled in the relevant area.30 The general impact of the 
Bolam test has been that medical practice is judged by doctors rather than lawyers. At 
best, it reinforces prevailing professional standards, but it means that the courts do 
little to alter medical culture or practice. 
 
The general dissatisfaction of lawyers with this approach can be seen in a series of 
short but trenchant articles in the New Law Journal written by an eminent personal 
injury lawyer claiming to explode the Bolam myth.31 Iain S. Goldrein opens by 
observing that the Bolam test was nothing other than part of a summing up to a lay 
jury and that it deludes judges into thinking that they balance the reasonableness of 
risk and precautions as lawyers rather than lay people. Thus judgments that should be 
issues of fact are treated as resolved by a legal rule. Goldrein tries to show that the 
Bolam test can be sidelined as being incompatible with the general structure of the 
law of tort. The most startling thing about these articles is that the consistent 
adherence of the House of Lords to the application of Bolam is completely ignored. 
The leading case of Whitehouse v Jordan was not even cited. 32 The decision in 
Maynard v W Midlands RHA was quoted as if was a departure from rather than a 
retrenchment of the peer review standard.33 An allusion to Sidaway v Bethlem RHG 
was made, but there was no recognition of the role played by the Bolam test in that 
decision.34 The reality is that the Bolam test is at the heart of the legal doctrine of 
medical malpractice, and cannot be treated as an anomaly. Only by completely 
ignoring the approach upheld by the highest court of the land could Goldrein suggest 
that a different philosophy prevailed. The House of Lords has had ample opportunity 
to refine or reject the Bolam test and the fact that it has chosen not to do so needs to 
be explained not ignored. 
 
The latest pronouncement from the House of Lords, Bolitho v City & Hackney HA has 
been seen by some as a step away from the dominance of the Bolam test.35 I want to 
suggest that it offers little new, and that the limitations of malpractice litigation have 
now to be tackled outside the courts and indeed are being addressed vigorously. 
Bolitho is an unusual case in that the question of professional standards came to the 
fore not in relation to what the defendant’s doctor had done, but in respect of the 
causal link between an accepted failure of care and the plaintiff’s injuries. The Health 
Authority accepted that their doctor’s failure to attend Patrick Bolitho fell below the 
required standard of care, but contended that even if the doctor had examined him she 
would not have intubated him. Only if she had intubated him would his death, due to 
respiratory failure leading to cardiac arrest, have been avoided. For that defence to 
succeed the health authority needed to show not only that the doctor would not have 
intubated but also that her failure to intubate would not itself have been negligent. The 
                                                 
30 De Freitas v O’Brien[1995] 6 Med LR 108. 
31 I. Goldrein, ‘Bolam – problems arising out of “ancestor” worship’ (1994) 144 NLJ 1237-39, 1248, 
‘Exploding the Bolam myth’ (1994) 144 NLJ 1282-84, ‘The interface of expert and jury’ (1994) 144 
NLJ 1315-6, ‘Exploding the Bolam myth’ (1994) 144 NLJ 1378, ‘Exploding the Bolam myth’ (1994) 
144 NLJ 1415-16, ‘Exploding the Bolam myth’ (1994) 144 NLJ 1449-50, ‘Exploding the Bolam myth’ 
(1994) 144 NLJ 1480-81. 
32 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267. 
33 Maynard v W Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 635. 
34 Sidaway v Bethlem RHG [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
35 Bolitho v City & Hackney HA [1997] 4 All ER 771. 
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Bolam test fell, therefore, to be considered in respect of a possible alternative course 
of events to that which actually happened. 
 
The House of Lords reviewed the case law and argued that the Bolam test did not 
require the courts simply to defer to professional judgment. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
noted that the words ‘responsible’ and ‘reasonable’ appeared in the test itself and that 
in Maynard Lord Scarman had referred to a body of opinion needing to be 
‘respectable’. He stated that where professional opinion is not capable of withstanding 
logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable 
or responsible. He emphasised that it would ‘very seldom’ be right for a judge to 
reach such a conclusion about the genuine views of a competent medical expert, but 
he reserved to the courts the right to do so. Expert opinion, he said, would provide the 
bench mark unless it could not logically be supported at all. 
 
The crucial point to be made about these statements is that they are really nothing 
new. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson himself pointed out, the opportunity to impose 
judicial standards has always been stressed by the courts. In Hills v Potter, reported in 
1983, the judge said that he must satisfy himself that medical opinion was ‘both 
respectable and responsible.’36 In Sidaway Lord Bridge rejected the suggestion that 
standards were merely a question for the medical profession (although Lord Scarman 
took a different view of the effect of applying Bolam).37 The actual decision in 
Bolitho went against the plaintiff precisely because the court accepted the expert 
evidence that a competent body of opinion supported refraining from intubation. This 
was despite the fact that the judge indicated that from a lay person’s perspective he 
would have expected intubation to be the right course.  
 
The impact of the Bolitho decision is still difficult to assess. There are examples of 
courts appearing to use it to justify a more interventionist role. In Sharpe v Southend 
HA, Creswell J seemed to reserve right to judge professional standards in a radiology 
case, relying on the Bolitho decision in the Court of Appeal, although his approach is 
still a little ambiguous.38 In Ian Leslie Marriott v W Midlands HA the Court of Appeal 
was split on the application of Bolitho.39 Beldam LJ held that the judge was entitled to 
subject medical evidence to her own analysis.40 However, he also held that the 
evidence in question in the case was only of a personal view and not indicative of 
whether a responsible body of opinion would agree. It would not, therefore have 
satisfied the requirements of the Bolam test even without judicial scrutiny of its 
substance. Pill LJ held that this was not a Bolitho case at all because there was only 
one view on what should have been done on the findings of fact actually made.41
 
However, there is still ample evidence of the judiciary continuing to decide cases on 
the basis of the Bolam approach. In Briody v St Helen’s & Knowsley AHA the judge 
                                                 
36 Hills v Potter [1983] 3 All ER 716, 728. 
37 Sidaway v Bethlem RHG [1985] 1 All ER 643, 663 (Bridge), 649 (Scarman); Scarman, ‘Law & 
Medical Practice’ in P. Byrne (ed.) Medicine in Contemporary Society (London King Edward’s 
Hospital Fund for London 1987) 131-39, 134. 
38 [1997] Medical Law Reports 299, esp. 303 (QBD). 
39 [1999] Lloyds Medical Law Reports 23. 
40 see p. 28. 
41 Swinton Thomas said ‘I agree’. The reporter places his concurring speech with that of Beldam LJ, 
but there is no indication of why it should be agreement with one rather than the other of his 
colleagues. 
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had sought to go beyond unchallenged medical evidence that a respectable body of 
medical opinion would have acted as consultant did. This was held to make the 
decision unsustainable on appeal.42 In Hallatt v NW Anglia HA the Bolitho approach 
was distinguished when looking at conflict of evidence between experts because their 
opinions (based in part on reference to medical textbooks) were rational and 
justifiable.43 In Rhodes v W Surrey & NE Hampshire HA the defendant was supported 
by eminent expert evidence representing a responsible professional body of opinion 
and was found therefore not to be negligent despite opposing experts.44
 
Some cases indicate that the judiciary strives to maintain the non-interventionist 
stance exemplified by Bolam even where it is satisfied that the health service should 
be held liable for injuries suffered by patients. In Wisniewski v Central Manchester 
HA a Bolitho style problem arose on the facts.45 The doctor had negligently not 
attended, but the defence claimed that there was no causal link with the plaintiff’s 
injuries because he would not have acted so as to avoid mishap. The judge had found 
that all reasonable doctors would have avoided the danger and that any other approach 
was unacceptable, rejecting the contrary opinion of some of the experts. The Court of 
Appeal criticised the judge’s rejection of the defence evidence. While criticisms could 
be made of it, it was logically supportable and therefore satisfied the Bolam test (as 
interpreted in Bolitho). Interestingly, although application of Bolitho was rejected,46 
the Court of Appeal found a different route to sustain liability. They held that the 
failure of the doctor to give evidence permitted inferences to be drawn against him. 
The court was, therefore, entitled to conclude that he might in fact have done what the 
plaintiff suggested (and would therefore have avoided mishap). Even though it would 
not have been negligent to have acted differently at a later stage in the care, the 
doctor’s own admitted error had on those facts caused the injury. 
 
A similar pattern of reaffirming the primacy of Bolam while upholding liability on the 
facts was seen in Penney, Palmer & Cannon v East Kent HA.47 The case concerned 
errors in a cervical smear programme whereby abnormal slides had not been 
identified as such. In the High Court there was a direct attack on the application of the 
Bolam test. His Honour Judge Pepitt QC rejected evidence that competent screeners 
could have made the errors that were made. He argued that the Bolam test did not 
really come into question because mistakes had been made and therefore the practice 
was not acceptable. The expert evidence related to whether the error was excusable, 
seen to be a different point. Further, he held that if the Bolam test was relevant, 
Bolitho applied to allow a finding that the evidence did not stand up to logical 
analysis. In the Court of Appeal, it was held that the Bolam test did apply to 
ascertaining the appropriate standard of care. However, the differences between the 
parties were found to be matters of evidence in relation to what was apparent from the 
specific slides. This was a different matter from the required standard of competence 
in reading them. It was proper for the court to resolve a conflict of evidence on what 
                                                 
42 [1999] Lloyds Medical Law Reports 185, esp. 191 (CA) 
43 [1998] Lloyds Medical Reports 197, esp. 203 (CA). 
44 [1998] Lloyds Medical Reports 256 (Aldershot & Farnham County Court). See similarly Bancroft v 
Harrogate HA [1997] Medical Law Reports 398 (CA). 
45 [1998] Lloyds Medical Reports 223 (CA). 
46 NB The High Court argument considered the application of Hucks v Cole [1994] Med LR 393 as that 
stage of the hearing predated the Bolitho decision. The arguments in the two cases are similar. 
47 [1999] Lloyds Medical Law Reports 123 (QBD), (1999) Times November 25 (CA). 
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the slides contained, which determined the case in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court 
of Appeal was therefore able to uphold liability without departing from the peer 
review standard of care in negligence. Even if the Bolitho decision represents a 
stronger affirmation of the judicial right to set standards for medicine, it seems clear 
that the courts prefer to avoid doing so. 
 
The key question to understand is why the judiciary has not seized the opportunity to 
move away from the non-interventionist interpretation of the Bolam test. While there 
may be some change in attitude, the Bolitho decision has not led to judges balancing 
risks on their own assessment as Goldrein’s approach would expect. As I have argued 
elsewhere, the most plausible explanation of this lies in the acceptance by the 
judiciary that doctors are altruistic, working under considerable pressure in the public 
interest and generally undeserving of liability. In a sense, they are seen as on our side, 
part of our community. Taken with self-doubt about the courts’ ability to comprehend 
the technical nature of medical knowledge and the interpretative skills required to 
apply it, this ideological paradigm has led the courts to be wary of departing from the 
assumption that peer review is the appropriate way to determine liability.48 Unless 
those assumptions are displaced, it seems unlikely that the test for malpractice will be 
developed. This review of the case law has shown that the failure of the law to 
promote good practice is directly related to its central conceptual tool – the Bolam test 
and that there seems little prospect at this time of the courts altering their approach. 
Medical lawyers need, therefore, to consider different strategies to improve standards 
of care.  
 
(2) Institutional Responses 
 
Equally importantly, both the NHS and the medical profession have good reasons to 
avoid complacency. Despite the relative friendliness of the test for negligence, the 
NHS spends considerable amounts of money, time and human resource on dealing 
with litigation, even litigation that is successfully defended. It is therefore keen to 
ensure that its exposure is reduced. For the medical profession, the maintenance of a 
favourable malpractice regime depends on the continued respect of the judiciary. At a 
time when confidence in medicine has been severely shaken, acting to reassure us that 
the profession can be trusted is a key strategy in staving off external regulation. 
Accountability through open and robust self-regulation is preferred to the imposition 
of judicial standards. 
 
The response to a perceived ‘malpractice crisis’ has taken a number of forms, a 
diversity of approaches that probably reflects the lack of reliable knowledge about the 
incidence and impact of litigation. Even information on the cost of litigation is of 
dubious value. In a single month, Parliament was given different figures on the cost of 
clinical negligence litigation for the year 1995-6 by the then Health Minister, Alan 
Milburn. On July 14 the cost of clinical litigation in England was said to be £149.1 
million. On the 24th of that month it was £173 million. 49   
 
                                                 
48 J. Montgomery, ‘Medicine, accountability and professionalism’ (1989) 16 JLS 319-39. 
49 Hansard, House of Commons, 14 July Written Answers Col 75, 24 July 1997 Written Answers Col 
726. 
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One series of measures aims to contain the costs of litigation. One of these is the new 
clinical negligence protocols, introduced under the civil procedure reforms to 
streamline the process of litigation, making it faster and cheaper. Other changes have 
been internal to the NHS. In 1989, NHS indemnity was introduced to replace 
reimbursement of insurance premiums in the hope that it would prove a cheaper 
option.50 Once they became directly responsible for the costs of litigation, NHS 
bodies introduced risk management strategies aimed to reduce exposure. These have 
been reinforced by the establishment of the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts 
(CNST), with elaborate standards for the management of risks and claims.51 Some of 
these standards have substantive impact on promoting good practice and go some way 
to mitigating the failures of the common law to set standards (see further below). 
 
The handling of clinical negligence litigation within the Health Service has also been 
streamlined in order to reduce costs and promote efficiency. NHS Trusts are no longer 
left to determine how to manage claims in independent isolation. The NHS Litigation 
Authority is now responsible for overseeing and giving advice on structured 
settlements, novel, contentious or repercussive claims, big claims (i.e. those worth 
more that £1 million) and on developments in law and legal practice.52 A prescribed 
panel of solicitors’ firms for CNST work will reintroduce a system that will ensure 
that defence work in clinical negligence litigation is concentrated on relatively few 
experienced firms (reversing the fragmentary effect of the decentralisation that 
resulted from the creation of NHS Trusts in the early 1990s). The intention is that the 
normally unpredictable development of malpractice law, dependent on the desire of 
particular plaintiffs and defendants to have their day in court rather than settle, should 
become more controlled. Perhaps enabling a more comprehensive and rational 
approach to moving legal doctrine forward. 
 
It is too early to be clear whether this desire will be matched by achievement. The 
defence of litigation against the NHS in respect of Haemophilia and Hepatitis C 
infection is being co-ordinated by the NHS Litigation Authority under its powers to 
call in and manage claims which are ‘novel, contentious or repercussive.’53 They will 
be handled through a single firm of solicitors.54 This will also enable expert evidence 
to be co-ordinated. Similarly claims in relation to negligent prescription of AZT have 
been identified for co-ordination in the same way.55  
 
The principal points to be made about the NHSLA at this point are concerned with the 
institutional nature of the response. These developments show a corporatist, centralist, 
conception of how the litigation game should be played. Cases are now brought 
against NHS bodies because they fund damages. This sweeps away some interesting 
                                                 
50 Claims of Medical Negligence against NHS Hospital and Community Dentists, HC(89)34. For 
commentary, see R. Bowles and P. Jones, ‘Better Safe than Sorry’ (1991) HSJ 21 Mar., 18–19; P. 
Reeves, ‘National Health Service Indemnity’ (1990) 87/18 LSG 24–5; P. Fenn and R. Dingwall, 
‘Medical Negligence and Crown Indemnity’ in J. Gretton (ed.), Health Care United Kingdom 1989 
(Birmingham: Policy Journals, 1990), 39–46; R. Dingwall and P. Fenn, ‘Is NHS Indemnity Working 
and is There a Better Way?’ (1994) 73 British J Anæsthesia 69–77. 
51 Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts, Risk Management Standards and Procedures: Manual of 
Guidance (London: NHS Litigation Authority 1997) Risk Management Standard No. 7. 
52 NHSE, The National Health Service Litigation Authority: Framework Document (NHSE 1996). 
53 NHSLA, ‘Haemophilia and Hepatitis C’ 97/C3 25 February 1997. 
54 NHSLA, ‘Re Hepatitis C Claims’ letter of 27th May 1997 
55 NHSLA ‘AZT (Retrovir/Zidovudine) Claims’ 97/C9, 6 November 1997. 
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areas of debate. The old system has gone by which individual doctors were sued as 
well as health authorities but apportionment of damages was arranged by the NHS 
and the medical defence organisations.56 This prevented the courts considering the 
attribution of responsibility within health care teams, leaving it to the NHS and 
medical professions to reach an extra-legal accommodation. Now, as it is NHS bodies 
who are sued, the NHSLA will be able to exercise a degree of control that was 
formerly lacking in previous fragmented systems. Anecdotal indications that the 
medical defence societies sometimes selected cases to fight with an eye to tactical 
advantage in the development of legal doctrine provide a precursor to a real 
possibility in the new corporate NHS. Thus, the NHSLA, rather than the local health 
authority, was responsible for deciding that the Canterbury screening case proceeded 
to the Court of Appeal in order to seek to overturn the apparent disregard for the 
ascendancy of the Bolam test in the High Court. 57 Had the High Court reasoning been 
sustained, the implications for the NHS as a whole might have been considerable.58
 
In addition to measures designed to reduce the cost of litigation, there has also been 
concern to divert grievances away from the courts into administrative procedures. 
Comprehensive complaints procedures were finally introduced into the NHS in 
1996.59 After long negotiation with the medical profession, the complaints procedures 
for general and clinical complaints were integrated. A semi-independent review 
system was established for cases where local resolution had not proved satisfactory. 
The jurisdiction of the Health Service Commissioners was extended to clinical 
matters. While the emerging evidence suggests that the new system has satisfied few 
of those experienced in its operation,60 one of the key functions of the new system is 
to keep disputes out of the courts where possible. An understanding of the way in 
which adverse incidents are raised and examined in the current medical law cannot be 
obtained without recognition of this corporate quasi-legal dimension to NHS dispute 
resolution. 
 
(3) Clinical governance 
 
The most significant response to the supposed ‘malpractice crisis’ can be found in 
attempts to assure the standard of clinical services. The central plank in the Blair 
Government’s approach to this issue of quality control is the introduction of ‘clinical 
governance’ into the NHS. This is defined as 
 
A framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for 
continuously improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high 
                                                 
56 HM 54(32). 
57 Penney, Palmer & Cannon v East Kent HA [1999] Lloyds Medical Law Reports 123 (QBD), (1999) 
Times November 25 (CA). 
58 The fact that a move away from the Bolam test might be regarded as desirable does not detract from 
the point being made here, which is that a corporate attempt is being made to influence the doctrinal 
development of the common law. For a single health authority fighting a single case, this would not be 
an economic use of funds, but for the NHS as a whole it is seen as an appropriate consideration. 
59 See J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (1997) ch 5. 
60 H. Wallace & L. Mulcahy, Cause for Complaint? An evaluation of the effectiveness of the NHS 
complaints procedure (London: Public Law Project 1999). 
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standards of care by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical 
care will flourish.61  
 
The Government wishes to see the culture of ‘blame’ replaced by one of learning. A 
comprehensive programme of quality improvement is intended to ensure systematic 
clinical audit programmes (no longer on a voluntary basis), the extension of evidence 
based practice, the implementation of national standards and guidance, effective 
monitoring of standards of clinical care, continuing professional development and 
research and development programmes. Risk management is to be extended to clinical 
risks, with systematic programmes to reduce risks. Adverse incidents should be 
identified through complaints and reporting procedures. The NHS should learn from 
them and act promptly to avoid their recurrence. Poor professional performance 
should be addressed early through clear reporting procedures and steps to help staff 
improve their standard of work.62 NHS bodies are currently undertaking baseline 
assessments of their ability to meet these quality control standards and drawing up 
development plans to move the agenda forward. 
 
This local culture of quality improvement is to be supplemented by a national 
framework to establish and assure standards. National Service Frameworks are to set 
benchmarks against which services can be assessed. Thus, the National Framework 
for Mental Health promises that people who contact their primary health care team 
with a common mental health problem should have their mental health needs assessed 
and should be offered effective treatments including referral to specialist services if 
necessary.63 They should be able to make contact with local services round the clock 
to meet their needs and receive adequate care. A duty doctor approved under the 
Mental Health Act must be available 24 hours a day.64 Every primary care group will 
need to work to develop resources within each general practice to assess mental health 
needs, to manage common mental health problems, and to support agreed care plans 
for those with severe mental illness.65 These care plans should be written and users 
should have a copy. 
 
Two new NHS bodies have been created as part of this quality assurance system. 
Standards will be identified by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence.66 This 
body will review evidence and recommend good practice in service delivery. This 
will include assessing the effectiveness of drugs and advising on how they should best 
be used. Policing performance on clinical governance will fall into the remit of the 
Commission for Health Improvement.67 It will give advice on the implementation of 
clinical governance and carry out a rolling review of inspections. Ultimately, the 
Commission will have the power to take over the management of failing bodies. 
 
                                                 
61 NHS Executive, Clinical Governance: Quality in the new NHS (DoH 1999) para. 6. See Annex 2 for 
the components summarised in this paragraph. A dedicated site has also been created on the NHSWeb, 
an intranet for the Service. 
62 See also GMC Maintaining Good Professional Practice (London: GMC 1998). 
63 NHS Executive, National Service Framework for Mental Health: Modern Standards & Service 
Models (1999). 
64 Ibid. pp. 33, 41. 
65 Ibid. p. 35. 
66 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Establishment and Constitution) Order 1999, SI 1999 No 
220; National Institute for Clinical Excellence Regulations 1999, SI 1999 No 260. 
67 Health Act 1999, ss 19-22, Sched 2. 
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It is far too early to test whether clinical governance will make a positive contribution 
to raising standards in the National Health Service. However, medical lawyers need to 
pay attention to assessing and testing that contribution. The new corporate approach 
to assuring standards has a number of implications for their subject. First, it creates a 
powerful and prescriptive system for defining service standards that is politically 
rather than legally accountable. There seems no obvious route by which those who 
believe that their access to particular treatments is being restricted by the imposition 
of corporate NHS standards could seek redress in the courts. Following national 
standards would provide a complete defence to malpractice allegations and be entirely 
reasonable for judicial review purposes.68 It is also unclear how doctors could raise a 
claim that their clinical freedom was being compromised if they did not agree with the 
standards being set. The model of individual clinical freedom, with the possibility of 
significant variations of practice, that the Bolam test protects is being supplanted by a 
corporatist version. The NHS does not share the reticence of the House of Lords in 
choosing between schools of thought. 
 
The Government has made great play of the introduction of a statutory duty of quality 
for NHS Trusts,69 supplementing the earlier limited focus on financial duties.70 This 
new duty is not, however, a duty to provide high quality services but to have quality 
assurance processes in place. It will not give rise to new rights of redress on the part 
of individuals. The purpose of the reform is to foster a particular culture of quality 
assurance and performance, not to extend legal grounds for review. Clinical 
governance leads to a corporatist approach to service development rather than 
individual clinical freedom. It seeks to build a particular sort of professional 
community built on institutional loyalty rather than personal freedom. This throws up 
a challenge to lawyers to consider whether clinical negligence litigation will become 
increasingly seen as a species of public authorities’ liability. In the past litigation 
against the health service has rarely been seen in these terms because most cases have 
taken the form of allegations of negligence against individual professionals.71 The 
newly corporatised NHS may need to be examined in a different light. The leading 
House of Lords cases on public service liability may need to be examined more 
carefully with an eye to their application to the NHS. 72
 
 
Patients’ Rights 
 
The law on patients’ rights within health care provides a crucial test of the ideological 
foundations of English medical law. It is here that one would expect to see most 
clearly that standards are set for the medical profession establishing the respective 
obligations and rights of the players. An examination of the law on consent and 
confidentiality soon shows, however, that the dominant theme is the creation of moral 
values within the professional and NHS communities and their reinforcement through 
                                                 
68 See R v Derbyshire HA, ex p Fisher [1997] Medical Law Reports 327 (QBD). 
69 Health Act 1999, s 18. 
70 NHS and Community Care Act 1990, s 10, Sched 2 para 6. 
71 For discussion of cases that depart from this norm, see J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (1997) 70-
74. 
72 See X v Bedfordshire CC, M v Newham LBC, E v Dorset CC [1995] 3 All ER 353 and Barrett v 
Enfield LBC [1999] 3 WLR 79. 
 16
the law. It also becomes clear that the traditional approaches to studying, defining and 
evaluating the law may need to be reconsidered. 
 
(1) Access to health care 
 
Historically, attempts to use the law to enforce rights to health care have been mostly 
frustrated by the English courts’ willingness to accept clinical and managerial 
discretion in the allocation of scarce resources.73 The traditional position can perhaps 
be most clearly illustrated by the case of Jaymee Bowen, whose father’s court action 
failed to secure NHS funding for the treatment he believed to be in Jaymee’s best 
interests.74 The Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion that her right to life could 
override the fact that Parliament had delegated the responsibility to allocate health 
resources to health authorities relying on clinical advice. Such attempts have been 
handicapped by the vagueness of legal definitions of the duties on the NHS to provide 
services. Thus general medical practitioners are obliged to provide ‘all necessary and 
appropriate personal medical services of the type usually provided by general medical 
practitioners’ – an essentially circular definition that reinforces professional practice 
rather than defines patients’ rights.75 The Secretary of State for Health has duties 
under the NHS Act 1977 to provide a comprehensive health service, but these duties 
are limited by reference to ‘such extent as he considers necessary to meet all 
reasonable requirements.’76
 
Disputes over the scope of patients’ rights will remain.77 However, the main legal 
disputes over access to health care will increasingly take a new form. As more 
decisions about the way in which the NHS delivers its care are taken centrally the 
focus of disputes will become less individualised and more a matter of challenging 
corporate practice. An early taste of the work of the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence was its refusal to recommend the influenza drug Relenza for NHS use 
with the elderly. This sort of decision will be the principal form of rationing in the 
‘New NHS’. The clearest indication of the legal route down which this development 
will take us is the litigation instigated by Pfizer when the Secretary of State for 
Health, Frank Dobson, sought to discourage doctors from prescribing Viagra, its new 
drug for the treatment of male impotence. 
 
The form of the litigation was judicial review of a NHS Circular in which doctors 
were advised not to prescribe Sildenafil (marketed as Viagra).78 The ruling was that, 
while the Secretary of State had the power to limit doctors’ power to prescribe, this 
could not be done through the administrative route of an advisory circular.79 Most 
interesting, however, is the way in which the legal arguments were cast. European 
community law, guaranteeing free movement of goods provided one of the strands. It 
was found that restricting the use of particular drugs for reasons of public finance was 
                                                 
73 See generally J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (1997) 63-70. 
74 R v Cambridge HA, ex p B [1995] 2 All ER 129. 
75 NHS (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992, SI 1992 No 625 (as amended), Sched 2 para. 
12(1). 
76 Ss 1-5. 
77 E.g. R v N Lancashire HA, ex p A (1999) Times 24 August. 
78 HSC 1998/158. 
79 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Pfizer [1999] Lloyds Medical Law Reports 289 (QBD). 
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acceptable within that law. This strand of argument concerns the relationship between 
two great industries, health services and pharmaceuticals, rather than the interests of 
patients. A second strand concerned the degree of clinical freedom of doctors within 
the service. Collins J held that the circular was unlawful because it required doctors to 
refrain from prescribing Viagra independently of whether their patient needed it 
according to their professional judgement. This line of argument is about the degree to 
which the NHS is entitled, under current regulations, to instruct doctors how to 
exercise their clinical judgement.  
 
What the Viagra litigation exposes, although it does not resolve it, is a clash between 
the traditional culture of individual clinical freedom and the new modernised NHS in 
which consistency of practice has become an important goal. With the emergence of 
the National Service Frameworks and the gradual extension the work of the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence, legal disputes about the degree of flexibility 
individual practitioners should have are likely to become more commonplace. They 
are likely to be fought not between patients and doctors or health authorities, but 
between industries and the central NHS institutions. The key battleground will be the 
extent to which the NHS is entitled to insist on conformity to its nationally determined 
priorities and values. In the past, this has largely been a matter for internal politics. 
With the creation of new institutions of control, it will become a matter for legal 
determination. Our understanding of the nature of medical law needs to incorporate 
this newly important dimension. 
 
 
(2) Consent issues 
 
It is widely accepted that the law of consent is a fundamental building block of 
medical law. It is this area of law that establishes the balance of power between 
patients and the health professionals who care for them.80 The legal requirement of 
consent is usually portrayed by commentators as reinforcing the ethical principle that 
we should have control over what happens to our bodies by providing a veto on 
unwanted intrusions. Thus, it has been said in the House of Lords that it is a 
‘fundamental principle, now long established, that every person's body is inviolate’.81 
Without consent, medical intervention on a competent person is unlawful.  
 
The same judge, Lord Goff, re-emphasised the principle in the Bland case: 
 
[I]t is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect 
must be given to the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult patient of sound 
mind refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which 
his life would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must 
give effect to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best 
interests to do so …  To this extent, the principle of the sanctity of human life 
must yield to the principle of self-determination … and, for present purposes 
                                                 
80 I. Kennedy, ‘The doctor-patient relationship’ in P. Byrne, Rights and Wrongs in Medicine (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 7-21, esp. 12-15 
81 Re F [1989] 2 FLR 376, 435 per Lord Goff. 
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perhaps more important, the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of his 
patient must likewise be qualified.82  
 
In fact, this rights based explanation of the foundation of the law of consent is not the 
only strand of judicial thinking. Lord Donaldson put forward a very different 
approach in which he distinguished between the legal and clinical purposes of 
consent. He explained the purpose of consent as follows. 
 
There seems to be some confusion in the minds of some as to the purpose 
of seeking consent from a patient (whether adult or child) or from someone 
with authority to give that consent on behalf of the patient. It has two 
purposes, the one clinical and the other legal. The clinical purpose stems from 
the fact that in many instances the co-operation of the patient and the patient's 
faith or at least confidence in the efficiency of the treatment is a major factor 
contributing to the treatment's success. Failure to obtain such consent will not 
only deprive the patient and the medical staff of this advantage, but will 
usually make it much more difficult to administer the treatment. I appreciate 
that this purpose may not be served if consent is given on behalf of, rather than 
by, the patient. However, in the case of young children knowledge of the fact 
that the parent has consented may help. The legal purpose is quite different. It 
is to provide those concerned in the treatment with a defence to a criminal 
charge of assault or battery or a civil claim for damages for trespass to the 
person. It does not, however, provide them with any defence to a claim that 
they negligently advised a particular treatment or negligently carried it out.83
 
The difference between these approaches is in part one of perspective. Lord Goff 
formulates his proposition from the point of view of the patient. Lord Donaldson 
explains the situation from the vantage point of a doctor. However, approaching the 
issue from these different sides of the doctor-patient relationship leads to variations of 
substance. The divergent strands can be identified in the leading consent case, 
Sidaway v Bethlem RHG.84 Lord Scarman’s speech begins with the assertion of 
patients’ rights to self-determination and constructs a framework based on the right to 
receive material information, subject to a therapeutic privilege enabling doctors to 
keep information back when they deem it necessary to do so in the patient’s best 
interests. Lord Diplock’s speech exemplifies the alternative approach. He argued that 
doctors had a single legal duty to exercise their skill and judgement in order to 
improve the patient’s health.85 Consent issues did not invite a distinctive approach in 
the way that Lord Scarman had suggested. Instead, Lord Diplock found, it was as 
much a matter of clinical judgment to decide how much to tell a patient about the 
treatment as it was to diagnose the problem or administer care. Although the other 
two speeches adopt slightly different stances, they broadly adopt the perspective of 
Lord Diplock by seeing the issue as one of medical duty rather than patient right.86
 
                                                 
82 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 FLR 1026, 1035-1036 per Lord Goff. 
83 Re J [1992] 2 FCR 785, 799-800. 
84 Sidaway v Bethlem RHG [1985] 2 All ER 643. 
85 (1985) 1 BMLR 132, 149 
86 I have discussed the interpretation of Sidaway in J. Montgomery Health Care Law (1997) 241-245. 
For an account with a rather different emphasis, see I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical 
Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988) pp 193-212. 
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Immediately after Sidaway some commentators took the view that the door was open 
to the development of the law of consent. Simon Lee wrote that he suspected 
 
That medical law and ethics [was] getting ahead of the field…. I have little 
doubt that Sidaway will come to be seen as a significant expansion of the 
ambit of informed consent…. I imagine that ever since Sidaway plaintiffs have 
been tacking on to claims of negligent treatment a claim that they were not in 
a position to give informed consent. Once these cases come to court, if not 
before, medical practice will alter to cover against such actions in the future.87
 
Ian Kennedy offered a similarly confident summary after a detailed analysis of the 
speeches: ‘The message of Sidaway is clear. Those who advise doctors already know 
it. Medical paternalism has had its day.’88
 
In fact, history suggests that this confidence has proved unfounded. The Court of 
Appeal has consistently regarded the Sidaway decision as requiring a professional 
standard of disclosure to be applied rather than developing the doctrine of informed 
consent.89 Although the occasional high court decision has been more adventurous,90 
the overall picture remains a non-interventionist one. In the only post-Bolitho Court of 
appeal decision the plaintiff’s claim that she should have been told more was rejected 
because the court accepted medical evidence that the risk that she alleged she had not 
been told was insignificant. Although the Court of Appeal suggested that patients 
should be told of significant risks, it recognised that this was no more than had been 
suggested in Sidaway and that it reflected the normal position that could be 
supplanted where circumstances were unusual.91 In Sidaway such circumstances 
seemed to import clinical discretion. 
 
It is implausible to suggest that the English courts’ refusal to adopt informed consent 
ideals is inadvertent.92 In Sidaway itself, there was extensive discussion of the 
doctrine as developed in Canada and the USA. Since then, the approach in Sidaway 
has been rejected by the Australian courts in the decision of Rogers v Whittaker.93 
This case was seen as sufficiently relevant to be reported in the English series of 
medical law reports but has been buried without trace before the English judges. No 
citation of it appears from a lexis search. Medical lawyers seem strangely 
disconnected from the judiciary. The opportunities have been there, but the courts 
have not taken them. 
                                                 
87 S. Lee, ‘Towards a Jurisprudence of Consent’ in J. Eekelaar & J. Bell (eds) Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence. Third Series (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1987) 199-220 at p. 216. 
88 I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1988) p 210. 
89 Gold v Haringey HA [1987] 2 All ER 888, Blyth v Bloomsbury HA [1993] 4 Med LR 151, Palmer v 
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MLR 245. See also the Scottish case of Moyes v Lothian HB [1990] 1 Med LR 463. Michael Jones 
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93 [1993] 4 Med LR 79. 
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Although the common law has failed to develop a law of informed consent, statutory 
interventions have sometimes moved things forward in that direction. Examination of 
regulations governing specific areas of health care identifies a number of examples of 
provisions likely to enhance higher standards of informed consent. Opticians are 
obliged to provide written diagnoses.94 Taken in context, however, this is probably 
related more to the desire to increase their exposure to market forces than to promote 
greater understanding of the care required. The main purpose of the requirement is to 
prevent patients being forced to buy their spectacles or contact lenses from the person 
who does their eye test. Armed with a written prescription they can shop around for 
the best fashion or financial deal.95 Dentists too are required to provide written 
treatment plans for their patients, giving them information to take away while they 
decide whether to accept a course of treatment.96 Where an organ is to be provided for 
transplantation by a live donor, statutory consent requirements supersede the common 
law. The Unrelated Live Transplant Authority has to be satisfied that a registered 
medical practitioner has given the donor an explanation of the nature and risks 
involved in the procedure, that the donor understands that explanation and that they 
have consented without coercion or the offer of an inducement.97  
 
None of these specific interventions really addresses the issues of substance. Most 
reflect rather than extend the limitations of the common law. The same is generally 
true of the activities of the Department of Health. General guidance has been issued 
on consent matters and on the court rulings, but it has done little to encourage 
practitioners to go beyond the minimal standards required by the courts.98 Although 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has issued model consent forms, 
these are aimed to facilitate recording of specific consents required by the legislation 
and the Code of Practice merely cross-refers to the general Department of Health 
guidance on consent issues.99 The Mental Health Act Code of Practice is similarly 
limited in its general treatment of informed consent.100
 
Just occasionally, the Department of Health has been prepared to go further. One such 
area is informed consent in relation to testing for HIV. This has been the subject of 
much debate amongst legal commentators. Some have argued that testing for HIV 
without explicit and full explanation might be unlawful under the law of trespass to 
the person. Although it is as yet untested in court,101 it seems unlikely that the courts 
would adopt that approach given their resistance to the use of battery as a form of 
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action in informed consent.102 However, the Department of Health has dealt with the 
matter by issuing its own guidance on the way in which informed consent should be 
obtained to HIV testing, following consultation with an expert advisory group.103
 
Counselling should follow four steps before obtaining a decision on testing. The first 
is to ensure that the individual understands the nature of HIV infection, transmission, 
and risk reduction. The second is to discuss risk activities the individual may have 
been involved in with respect to HIV infection including the date of the last risk 
activity and the perception of the need for a test. The third is to discuss the benefits 
and difficulties to the individual, his or her family and associates of having a test and 
knowing the result whether positive or negative. Finally the individual should be 
given details of the test and how the result will be provided. Only after this should the 
professionals seek an informed decision about whether or not to proceed with the test. 
The guidance provides further suggestions on what might be included in discussion to 
assist professionals engaged in counselling and reports on survey work on what 
clients have been found to want. 
 
It may be that the key here is that expert advisory groups have become reluctant to 
display the traditional deference to the law and are demonstrating professional 
frustration with the timid approach of the common law. The General Medical Council 
has now issued guidance on securing consent that goes far beyond the limited 
observations of the courts. It advises that patients have a right to information and sets 
out guidance on what patients may wish to know. These include 
 
• Details of diagnosis and prognosis; 
• Uncertainties about diagnosis, including options for further investigation 
prior to treatment; 
• Options for treatment and management, including the option not to treat; 
• Likely benefits, probabilities of success, discussion of any serious or 
frequently occurring risks, lifestyle changes that may be caused or 
necessitated by treatment. 104 
 
The substance of this advice will not be unfamiliar to commentators and lawyers. The 
point is not that there is some radical shift occurring within the profession. It is that 
the doctrine of informed consent proposed by Lord Scarman is becoming established 
within the professional community despite its rejection by the courts.  
 
The Guidance issued by the Royal Surgical Colleges on ethical and legal issues has 
effectively rejected the ruling in Sidaway, giving content to the obligation to counsel 
patients in terms of the doctrine of informed consent. Patients should be told about 
common side effects, significant risks, alternative treatment options in the detail 
required by a reasonable person in the circumstances of the patient so as to make a 
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relevant and informed judgment.105 This can be seen as a victory for the rejected 
speech of Lord Scarman in Sidaway, but it has come via the internal normative work 
of the medical profession not through the courts. It probably goes too far to suggest 
that departing from this guidance will be Bolam negligent, as one commentator has 
suggested.106 However, as a step towards enshrining the values of informed consent in 
the culture of UK health care, professional guidance seems to be providing more than 
the courts have been prepared to offer. 
 
There is, however, another important dimension to developments in the position of the 
patient that points to a further pressure on the individualistic models on which the law 
is based. The current Government’s vision for the ‘New NHS: Modern and 
Dependable’107 envisages that the assumption that the principal source of information 
on medical care will be communication from the treating physician will quickly 
become unfounded. Part of the Government’s programme for improving the nation’s 
health is to construct a new social contract for health in which citizens take 
responsibility for being active partners in health promotion. Those with chronic health 
problems are to be encouraged to become ‘expert patients’, knowledgeable in their 
condition.108 The Information Strategy for the NHS aims to provide electronic access 
to general information.109
 
The fundamental and radical development here is that the position of patient is being 
detached from a relationship with an individual doctor and becoming a relationship 
with an organisation. Lawyers will know that the NHS has issued standard consent 
forms,110 but in fact the impact of the NHS on consent issues has already been more 
significant than this and is likely to become even more so. The NHS Executive has 
indicated that the system for review of the effectiveness of treatment under the 
auspices of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence will probably generate 
advice on what patients should be told to secure informed consent to particular 
treatments.111 There may thus become NHS norms for information giving, building a 
culture of informed consent within the service. 
 
Another example of service developments generating more far reaching expectations 
than the common law can be seen within the risk management processes being 
adopted to deal with perceptions of escalating litigation. It is a requirement of 
membership of the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts that patient information 
sheets are produced for common elective procedures showing risks and benefits.112 
To obtain level 1 of the risk management standards, these must be available for at 
least 10 common elective treatments. To obtain level 2, there must be information 
leaflets for at least 20 such treatments across a range of specialties. To obtain level 3 
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there must be a clear mechanism for patients to obtain additional information about 
their condition. 
 
Our traditional paradigms are based on a relationship between individuals, but we 
need to move towards models recognising the importance of institutions. In fact, of 
course, we can see once again that this is not really new. It has long been the case that 
the responsibility for securing consent has rested with the health care system rather 
than the individual doctor. In the NHS consent to surgery will often not be obtained 
by the person actually performing the procedure. This has been made explicit in the 
standard consent forms for the avoidance of doubt.113  
 
Meeting the demands of patients for information and autonomy requires that the 
cultural resources of the NHS community be harnessed. Protecting patients’ rights is 
being done through the values of the NHS and professional communities not as an 
imposition from outside. Our understanding of the role of law needs to be developed 
to reflect this strengthening of the importance of corporate values. 
 
 
(3) Confidentiality and data protection 
 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of this move towards the corporatisation of patients’ 
rights can be found in the area of confidentiality. The traditional model of what it 
means to be a patient envisages an intimate relationship in a private consulting room. 
So far as confidentiality is concerned, the implication is that patients confide in the 
doctor on the understanding that the information will go no further. In reality, health 
care is delivered by a multi-disciplinary team which needs to share information to be 
effective. Considering the importance attached to confidentiality by patients and 
health professionals, the law is surprisingly undeveloped.114 What we do have, 
however, displays many of the tensions that have been explored in this paper. 
 
The issues can be illustrated by reference to two important health confidentiality 
cases. The first is the decision in W v Egdell where a mental health patient claimed 
that the release of a privately commissioned medical report to his psychiatrist and to 
the Home Office constituted a breach of confidentiality.115 The Court of Appeal 
explored the basis of medical confidentiality and found that it was a matter of public 
more than private interest. This public interest rests in the fact that confidentiality is a 
pre-requisite for effective health services. Doctors cannot effectively diagnose and 
treat without accurate information and they will not receive that from patients without 
the promise of confidentiality. The importance of confidentiality is therefore derived 
from the nature and values of the organisations and professions within which the 
enterprise of health care is carried out. This insight is reinforced by the way in which 
the Court of Appeal in Egdell relied heavily on the professional guidance given by the 
General Medical Council when seeking to define the limits of confidentiality. 
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This public interest approach was called into question in the other key health 
confidentiality case, R v Department of Health, ex p Source Informatics.116 The case, 
concerned the legitimacy of using anonymised data on the prescribing habits of GPs. 
As with the Viagra litigation, the form that the action took was a challenge to the 
lawfulness of advice from the Department of Health by a commercial organisation. 
That advice suggested that data on prescribing could not be used without breaching 
confidentiality because the patient would not have consented to such use, either 
explicitly or implicitly.  
 
The case raised arguments that demonstrate the tensions that arise in a system of 
socialised health care. In the High Court, Latham J, took the view that the key 
question was patient agreement to the use of the information (and therefore legitimate 
use was limited by the scope of that consent).117 He held that patient consent was 
essential before the information could be used and therefore that the Department of 
Health’s Guidance was sound. However, this strong support for the individualist 
foundation of confidentiality was tempered by allusions to the possibility that there 
might be a special regime for the NHS. Latham emphasised the commercial context of 
the applicant’s business and the risks that the pharmacists, from whom the applicants 
wished to collect data, might benefit from that business (placing them in a conflict of 
interest). Latham J noted the possibility that the public interest might justify 
disclosure where the information was to be used for NHS purposes.  
 
The Court of Appeal took a rather different approach. It found a solution to the case 
by looking at the value that underpinned the legal protection of medical confidences. 
It identified this as lying in the protection of privacy and reasoned that only uses of 
confidential information that compromised the privacy of patients were unlawful. As 
the data would only be used in an anonymised form, it would not be traceable to any 
individual and consequently would not threaten their privacy. The wider arguments of 
public policy were not discussed in detail, but Simon Brown LJ indicated that he 
anticipated that the scope of the legal protection for confidentiality would be 
‘circumscribed’ so as to recognise the need for audit, research and management 
within the NHS.118 He declined to pursue arguments about implicit consent on the 
basis that they were likely to lead to the same conclusion as arguments based on the 
public interest. Yet disentangling these approaches is fundamental to clarifying 
whether English law is more concerned with protecting patients’ rights or providing 
the foundations for an effective health service. The two approaches are not 
contradictory and steps have been taken to encourage improved patient understanding 
of how information is shared within the NHS in order to enhance the plausibility of 
arguments based on implicit consent.119 However, whether they go far enough 
remains to meet the legitimate concerns of patients’ rights remains a matter for 
debate. 
 
These tensions in the law of confidentiality indicate how important it is to examine 
how the law incorporates the values of the NHS in order to understand the 
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development of medical law. However, there is another even more important 
dimension of our conceptualisation of confidentiality that needs to be recognised as 
requiring a new appreciation of the area. The traditional image of confidentiality is of 
a cosy relationship between a patient and their doctor. On this model, confidentiality 
ensures that people outside that relationship do not get to hear the intimate details of 
the conversation. The reality in modern health care is rather different. Effective care 
depends on the sharing of information within professional teams. There is a circle of 
confidentiality within which information circulates and confidentiality is preserved 
against those outside the circle rather than within it.120
 
The modernisation of the NHS, particularly the embracing of information technology 
through the electronic health record, requires us to see the problems of confidentiality 
in a different way.121 Guarantees of confidentiality are increasingly only deliverable 
through effective service management because no individual can control the flow of 
information. The NHS has responded by appointing ‘Caldicott’ guardians in each 
organisation to oversee the proper protection of personal information.122 The key 
aspects of this concern restriction of access to records, because it is the records in 
which information is contained (rather than the information itself) that can be most 
easily protected. Records will become accessible by a wider range of people, remote 
from the person who drew them up. It will no longer be possible to expect the person 
making the record to preserve their confidentiality. The paradigm is therefore shifting 
from one of confidentiality to one of data protection. The extension of data protection 
principles to all records, whether held manually or electronically is the natural 
consequence of these developments.123  
 
 
(4) Conclusion 
 
This brief review of patients rights in the area of access to services, consent and 
confidentiality shows three trends that are key to the transition of medical law towards 
its new paradigm. First, there is the failure of the common law to deliver the rights 
that commentators support. This has led in some areas to professional and political 
intervention to foster a more patient focussed system of values. This second trend of 
collegiate responsibility requires a broader vision of the way in which norms are set if 
medical lawyers are to fully understand their subject. Thirdly, the Government’s 
vision for a modernised NHS will bring new challenges that fit uncomfortably with 
the idea that the lynchpin of medical law is the doctor-patient relationship. The 
expectation of more fully informed patients is to be met as much by corporate activity 
as by disclosure by the treating doctor. Protecting privacy will be mainly a task for 
organisations. Medical law is becoming more and more a matter of corporate 
governance. 
 
 
                                                 
120 There is some recognition of this aspect of confidentiality in Re W [1998] 2 FCR 405. 
121 The argument summarised in this paragraph is elaborated in J. Montgomery, ‘Confidentiality in the 
modernised NHS: the challenge of data protection’ (1999) 146 Bulletin of Medical Ethics 18-20. 
122 ‘Caldicott Guardians’ HSC 99/012. 
123 Data Protection Act 1998. 
 26
Medical Ethics 
 
Traditionally, medical lawyers have seen the relationship between ethics, law and 
medicine as a hierarchy. The purest discipline is ethics, the substance of which should 
be reflected in the law, which in turn should use its coercive aspects to bring medicine 
into line. Medical law is thus a species of applied medical ethics. This paradigm 
implies that the law should lead the medical profession towards more ethical practice. 
In fact however, the picture is much more complex. To a great extent, the courts have 
followed rather than led the profession. I want to suggest that this flows deliberately 
from the judicial understanding of the nature of the task with which the courts are 
required to grapple. 
 
 
(1) Caesarian section cases 
 
The literature on court authorised caesarian sections is now extensive and this section 
does not seek to provide an account of the issues and merits of the string of legal 
cases. Rather, I hope to consider what can be learnt from the flurry of activity in the 
High Court about the way in which medical law develops and draw some conclusions 
about confidence, or lack of it, in the ability of the judiciary to take medical law 
forward. I want to suggest that those cases demonstrate substantial technical failures 
of law making that call into question the effectiveness of relying of litigation to 
develop the principles of medical law. This in turn forces us to consider whether 
actively promoting the development of professional values is a more promising 
strategy. 
 
The story starts not at the beginning but with the decision of the then President of the 
Family Division in Re S.124 This was a decision that had to be taken in circumstances 
of some urgency in an emergency hearing during a lunchtime recess. It is a tribute to 
the accessibility of the courts that a judicial hearing could have been arranged, held 
and concluded within 50 minutes of the matter being brought to the attention of 
officials. However, considerable reservations have to be expressed about the impact 
of that decision.  
 
First, the President authorised the surgical delivery of the woman without giving 
reasons. One can extrapolate from the arguments presented to him that that two 
factors were regarded as significant, although his judgment gives little clue as to 
whether it was those that persuaded him. First, that the pregnancy was at term (six 
days overdue, although that is well within the margins of normal variation). Second, 
that there would be no adverse effects on the mother (presumably overriding her 
wishes was not an adverse effect for these purposes). There is no indication in the 
judgment that questions of the woman’s competence were addressed. Nor is there any 
account of the legal status of the child. Two legal authorities were referred to. One, an 
American decision was in fact erroneously interpreted. The second merely left the 
question open. The most direct authority, which was substantially against a non-
consensual operation, was not cited.125
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The lessons to be learnt from this stage in the history are not about the merits of the 
decision so much as the nature of the process of law making. If one of the functions of 
the law is to establish canons of acceptable conduct, the consequence of an 
unexplained decision such as this is unwelcome uncertainty. Following Re S widely 
different interpretations were made within the medical profession of its implications. 
On anecdotal evidence, it has been said that obstetricians in one hospital in the South 
of England (not Southampton, for the avoidance of doubt) were telling women that 
they had better accept their advice about caesarians because the court would override 
any refusal if asked to do so. Thus, the President’s decision was used as a powerful 
bargaining counter to coerce women. In contrast, the Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists used the lack of reasoning to issue robust guidance that 
effectively advised that it would never be ethical to impose a caesarian section on an 
unwilling woman.126
 
The string of High Court cases that followed suggested that the line taken by the 
doctors from my anecdotal source was the more accurate. Even when they recognised 
the fact that the decision in Re S was incompatible with earlier Court of Appeal 
authority the judiciary persisted in authorising non-consensual sections on the basis of 
the interests of the unborn child. In Norwich and Norfolk NHS Trust v W Johnson J 
authorised a caesarian section on the basis of an account of a telephone discussion 
with a psychiatrist who had interviewed the woman.127 That psychiatrist believed that 
the woman could have instructed a solicitor and understood the treatment options. 
However, he told the Official Solicitor’s representative that she was not able to 
balance the various factors involved. On this basis, the woman was found to be 
incompetent and the operation was authorised. 
 
In the middle of the hearing of the Norwich case, Johnson J broke off to deal with 
another similar case. The consultant obstetrician was clear that the woman was 
competent, yet the judge felt able to override that judgment without further evidence. 
He said that 
 
a patient who could, in those circumstances, speak in terms which seemed to accept 
the inevitability of her own death, was not a patient who was able properly to 
weigh-up the considerations that arose so as to make any valid decision, about 
anything of even the most trivial kind, surely still less one which involved her own 
life.128
 
Such a judgment, considering the decision reached rather than the capacity for and the 
process of reasoning is incompatible with the established approach to assessing 
capacity as was clearly pointed out by the Court of Appeal in Re MB.129 The judge 
seemed to feel vindicated by the fact that the woman in fact changed her mind 
(presumably suddenly becoming competent in the process) and that the procedure was 
carried out by consent. That this indicated that she could have been persuaded rather 
than coerced was not commented upon. 
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If the task of the courts is to establish rules for ethical practice, these early cases 
indicate a series of failures of law making.130 Without reasons, no principles can be 
discerned. Where earlier authorities are ignored there can be no confidence that the 
law is consistently applied. Further, where judicial decisions were taken on what later 
proved to be wholly inaccurate accounts of the facts there can be little confidence in 
the objectivity of the legal system. Thus, in the St George’s case the court proceeded 
on the basis that the woman was in labour when in fact this was not the case.131  
 
The Court of Appeal has now provided us with a clear account of the law based on the 
fundamental principles that competent women are free to decide what treatment to 
accept and that fetal interests cannot prevail over their right to this autonomy. This 
explanation of the task in terms of legal principle fits well with the traditional 
paradigm of law as applied ethics. However, the practice of the courts of first instance 
suggests that such law making may not be how they understand their role. Lord 
Justice Thorpe has suggested that it is unrealistic to expect judges to disregard the 
human reality of cases in favour of cold legal principles.132 In many ways his view is 
more characteristic of the approach of the courts in medical law cases than the more 
traditional view. I want to suggest that the apparent failures of law making may 
highlight the need to see the courts as fulfilling a slightly different role. 
 
 
(2) Withdrawing treatment 
 
The cases on withdrawal of life sustaining treatment provide an informative insight 
into the problems. What they suggest is a conscious resistance to the idea that the 
courts should establish rules from which the proper steps can be derived, rather than 
reinforcing processes for good practice. 
 
In the early 1980s it seemed that the courts were seeking to reach a rough and ready 
conception of the quality of life that was thought to require medical intervention even 
when the doctors and family were not sure. In the Baby Alexandra case,133 the Court 
of Appeal authorised an operation to be performed to remove an intestinal blockage 
from a child with Down’s Syndrome. Lord Justice Templeman suggested that this was 
because her life would not be ‘intolerable’ or ‘so awful that in effect the child must be 
condemned to die.’ For those who look to the courts to establish boundaries, this 
looked like an attempt to move towards a formulation of quality of life factors. The 
task for the courts would therefore be to refine the approach until it became more 
workable. 
 
This was tried in 1990 where James Munby QC for the Official Solicitor invited the 
Court of Appeal to consider where the line should be drawn. He initially proposed a 
sanctity of life principle, under which the possibility of prolonging life would 
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outweigh any question of the quality of existence that could be secured. When this 
was rejected, on the basis that it introduced a principle to compete with the child’s 
best interests, he offered a less absolute formulation. This was that ‘a court is only 
justified in withholding consent to such treatment if it is certain that the quality of the 
child’s subsequent life would be “intolerable” to the child, “bound to be so full of pain 
and suffering” and “demonstrably so awful that the child must be condemned to 
die”.’134 The Court of Appeal rejected that offer too.  
 
Rather than identifying rules or principles, the Court of Appeal preferred to examine 
the processes for decision making. Lord Donaldson described the way in which the 
law sought to ensure a partnership between parents and professionals. The law 
created, he argued, a sort of stand off in which neither can determine what happens 
without securing the consent of the other. Doctors could not impose treatment without 
parental consent, but parents could not demand particular types of care. Their 
lordships were seeking to foster and promote a particular culture rather than to 
influence outcomes. Ultimately, as the cases consistently show, the courts almost 
universally side with the medical profession when this partnership breaks down, 135 
but this does nothing to undermine the judicial encouragement to work together. 
 
The fact that this resistance to rule making is conscious rather than inadvertent makes 
some sense of the decision of the House of Lords in the Bland case.136 Despite the 
many arguments that were raised and debated, in the end the legal logic of the 
decision is simple and straightforward. Withdrawing life-sustaining care from Tony 
Bland was to be classed in law as an omission to keep him alive (which could in 
certain circumstances be permissible) rather than an act that caused his death (which 
would be illegal). As it was an omission, the doctors were at liberty to withdraw the 
care providing that they had no legal duty to keep him alive. Their legal obligation to 
keep him alive was determined by professional opinion. So long as a responsible body 
of relevant professional opinion supported the doctors’ view that it was in Tony 
Bland’s best interests to be allowed to die, then it was lawful to do so. Categorical 
distinctions between medical treatment and providing nourishment and water were 
rejected in favour of an extension of the Bolam test. While the judges sought to 
emphasise the seriousness of the decision it is hard to discern any real move away 
from the peer review that Bolam implies.137
 
Considerable weight, however, was placed on the fact that the profession had itself 
created guidance on the way in which patients in persistent vegetative state should be 
cared for. The House of Lords was in a position to accept a non-interventionist 
position even in the context of decisions about life and death because they were 
satisfied that medical ethics provided a safeguard against abuse. This safeguard is not, 
however, provided by a set of quasi-legal rules. It quickly became apparent that 
departure from the letter of the guidance on diagnosis and management of patients in 
permanent vegetative state did not make practice unacceptable. In Frenchay NHS 
Trust v S there was no independent clinical assessment and not all the diagnostic 
criteria were established. It was still legitimate to withhold a life sustaining 
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intervention.138 In Re H the patient showed some visual tracking and was therefore 
outside the Royal College of Physicians criteria (although not an international 
consensus document).139 Discontinuation of artificial life support was authorised. In 
Re D the patient had two further reactions in addition to visual tracking that took her 
outside the scope of the PVS diagnosis, but it was still permissible to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment.140 The courts are not taking comfort in the fact that the medical 
profession has established law-like rules. Rather, the existence of guidance reassures 
the judiciary that medicine is a moral activity that will respond appropriately to the 
dilemmas. Once satisfied that there is a strong moral community of this sort, the 
courts are happy to regulate medical ethics through the filter of peer review. 
 
This reliance on professional ethics can be seen quite explicitly in comments of 
Balcombe LJ in Re W.141 It was suggested that there was a disturbing consequence of 
holding that parents could consent even where their children were Gillick competent. 
This was that an abortion could be forced upon a 17 year old girl who wished to keep 
her baby. Balcombe LJ deflected the force of that objection by saying that he could 
not conceive of a case in which a doctor would collude with such a parental decision. 
The law was developed on the specific assumption that the medical profession has an 
established ethical approach to dilemmas raised by their work. 
 
 
(3) Judicial roles 
 
Medical lawyers would do well to re-examine their expectations of the courts. The 
development of standards to guide health professions in grappling with issues of 
medical ethics is by no means the most common approach taken by the judiciary. 
Even when standards are set, the courts are as likely to affirm the work already done 
by the professions as to examine the matter independently. In general adherence to 
professional standards provides a shield against criticism. However, the post-Bland 
PVS cases show that those standards will not usually furnish litigants with a sword 
with which to coerce doctors. 
 
There are, in fact, a number of other ways in which the judiciary has explained its 
contribution. As medical law moves forwards it will need to consider these more 
carefully. One such approach sees the involvement of the courts as a mechanism for 
validating the work of the medical community. It is hard to see the exhortation from 
the House of Lords in Bland to bring PVS case to court as resulting in the 
development of legal principles. Their lordships explained their suggestion of court 
involvement as responding to the uncertainty over the nature of PVS and the 
consequent scope for disagreement between relatives and between professionals. 
Further cases have brought those issues before the judges, but have done little to 
resolve the uncertainty. 
 
Nevertheless, the courts have offered reassurance over the careful way in which 
decisions are taken. Judicial scrutiny can be seen as a way of ensuring that decisions 
                                                 
138 [1994] 2 All ER 403. 
139 [1998] 3 FCR 174. 
140 [1998] 1 FCR 498. 
141 Re W (1992) 9 BMLR 22, 41. 
 31
are properly thought through. Once exposed to public debate, there is the scope for 
others to engineer changes in approach even if the judges are reluctant to do so. This 
may explain the insistence that cases are heard in public.142 It explains the desire of 
the courts to allow public discussion of the issues raised in wardship cases, while 
trying to protect the privacy of the individual children.143 The courts also sometimes 
see themselves as providing a forum for airing scientific controversy. This was 
highlighted by Wilson J as being a feature of litigation over whether a child’s HIV 
status should be tested despite the parents’ opposition.144 The role of the courts here is 
as a sort of safety valve to ensure public awareness of the way in which medical ethics 
works. This approach assumes that the medical community is fundamentally sound 
ethically and provides a form of quality assurance. 
 
A different sort of role can be seen in relation to the therapeutic value of litigation. 
Judges suggest that court involvement can demonstrate respect for the gravity of 
decisions. Thus, it has been suggested that cases in which it is proposed to override 
the sincerely held views of Jehovah’s Witness parents and order that their children 
should receive blood transfusions should be heard in the High Court.145 It is thought 
that this make the decision more palatable than it being taken merely by doctors. 
Judges also see themselves as lifting the burden of decisions by taking responsibility 
for them.146 Whether these sentiments are shared by the families and doctors is 
unknown. However, they suggest that there may be other ways of understanding the 
contribution that the law can make than those adopted by the traditional paradigm of 
medical law. If the courts are seen as part of the overall framework of decision-
making, integrated within the broader health care community rather than imposed 
upon it, then some of the decisions become easier to understand. Different issues then 
become apparent, such as whether courts are in fact able to build public confidence 
and reassure them, or whether they are a cost-effective mechanism for such tasks. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This analysis of an illustrative range of areas of health care law has demonstrated the 
apparent failure of medical law as generally conceived by commentators. Judged 
against the idea that it is a mechanism for setting standards for health professionals on 
behalf of society, medical law has failed to deliver. The dominance of the ‘Bolam’ 
philosophy has prevented the courts playing a leading role in raising professional 
standards and enhancing patients’ rights. This failure has led to the health professions 
and the NHS seeking to create their own mechanisms for meeting these challenges. It 
has been suggested that those responses have been more effective in pursuing the 
agendas that medical lawyers have traditionally set out and that consideration should 
be given to the potential for consolidating these achievements.  
 
Recognising this transformation requires us to focus our activity in different ways. 
The materials on which lawyers should be working will increasingly be those 
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produced within the various communities of the health care system. Looking at the 
way in which institutional norms are created, and most importantly challenged, will 
be crucial tasks for those looking to influence practice. The concept of law with which 
we work has to become more complex. The force of ‘law’ and ‘guidance’ needs to be 
evaluated. The sources of those norms need to be identified and analysed. Our 
understanding of who are the lawmakers, and how their authority can be legitimated 
for the wider public, needs to be reformed. In short, the traditional paradigm that sees 
the health professions and the institution of the NHS as the principal problem, forces 
to be constrained, needs be replaced by a broader paradigm that sees them as part of 
the solution.  
 
This is both a descriptive and a normative project. Without regard to the complexity 
of medical law and its current reliance on organisational and professional norms, we 
cannot properly understand why we have the laws that we do. However, when the 
changing nature of health care is considered, it can be seen that the new focus of 
medical law on its institutional context can offers considerable opportunity for 
influence and progress. Seen in this perspective, the judicial approach can be seen as 
an attempt to exploit the fact that the professions have a strong culture of values rather 
than to establish an independent system of law. The ‘New NHS’, with its corporate 
and technological focus, will force a more institutionalised approach upon us. The 
traditional cornerstones of medical ethics, consent and confidentiality, now require the 
strengthening of corporate rather than individual ethics. 
 
These insights are not necessarily novel, but the attempt to incorporate them into the 
traditional paradigm of medical law has tended to marginalise the regulatory 
techniques that have proved most effective. Medical law will need to draw more on 
the acceptance of health care as a public service; on public law rather than private 
law. Patients are now primarily the responsibility of the NHS not individual 
professionals, and this transition would reflect that reality. In its emerging 
manifestation, medical law will become geared to generating particular values and 
standards, consciously aiming to create the sort of morality that we want for our 
health services. It will seek to make the transition from an ambitious project that has 
collapsed into protecting professionals at work from outside scrutiny into a force for 
progress. 
 
 
 
